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Abstract: 30 
While there have been no cases of type-2 wild poliovirus for over 20 years, transmission of type-2 31 
vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV2) and associated paralytic cases in several continents represent a 32 
threat to eradication. The withdrawal of the type-2 component of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) 33 
was implemented in April 2016 to stop VDPV2 emergence and secure eradication of all poliovirus 34 
type 2. Globally, children born after this date have limited immunity to prevent transmission. Using a 35 
statistical model, we estimate the emergence date and source of VDPV2s detected between May 36 
2016 and November 2019. Outbreak response campaigns with monovalent OPV2 are the only 37 
available method to induce immunity to prevent transmission. Yet, our analysis shows that using 38 
monovalent OPV2 is generating more paralytic VDPV2 outbreaks with the potential for establishing 39 
endemic transmission. The novel OPV2 is urgently required, alongside a contingency strategy if this 40 
vaccine does not materialise or perform as anticipated.  41 
 42 
One Sentence Summary: Outbreaks of vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) serotype 2 can be traced 43 
to use of the oral poliovirus vaccine in outbreak response campaigns. 44 
 45 
Main Text: 46 
Ever since the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) was first identified in 2000 as the source of a paralytic 47 
poliomyelitis outbreak, vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPV) have been a known obstacle to 48 
achieving polio eradication [1, 2]. Despite the global withdrawal of the serotype 2 component of 49 
OPV (OPV2), paralytic poliomyelitis cases associated with serotype 2 VDPV (VDPV2) have been 50 
reported in expanding global geographies. This is important as there is now a global cohort of 51 
children without immunity against serotype 2 that would prevent transmission, which could result in 52 
established endemicity of the virus. The inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) can protect against 53 
  
paralysis but provides limited intestinal immunity to stop transmission [5].  Therefore, the method to 54 
control VDPV2 transmission is through vaccination campaigns with the monovalent OPV2 55 
(mOPV2) [3]. However, any use of mOPV2 carries the risk of seeding more VDPV2 [4].  56 
 57 
After the eradication of the serotype 2 wild poliovirus (WPV), vaccination continued with OPV2 as 58 
part of the trivalent vaccine (tOPV, containing serotypes 1, 2 and 3) (Figure S1), resulting in periodic 59 
outbreaks of VDPV2 (as well as VDPV1 and VDPV3) and cases of vaccine-associated paralytic 60 
poliomyelitis (VAPP) [5]. This is because the attenuated virus strains contained in OPV can mutate 61 
and re-acquire factors associated with causing paralytic disease and transmission [6]. Populations 62 
with low immunisation coverage are particularly at risk of spread [6]. Once the eradication of the 63 
serotype 2 WPV was certified, it was decided to withdraw the OPV2 to prevent paralysis caused by 64 
type 2 poliovirus  (Figure S1) [5]. In April 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) 65 
coordinated a globally synchronised switch from tOPV to bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing Sabin 1 66 
and 3) in all routine and supplemental immunization activities, commonly referred to as ‘the Switch’, 67 
(Figure S1) [7]. As a risk mitigation strategy, countries began to introduce a dose of inactivated 68 
poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into routine immunisation schedules to protect against paralysis from type 2 69 
poliovirus [8]. However, an estimated 143 million children have not received IPV since April 2016 70 
due to supply shortages (43 million) and poor routine immunisation coverage (100 million) [9] 71 
 72 
It was predicted that after the Switch, circulation of type 2 polioviruses would steadily disappear. 73 
Some VDPV2 outbreaks were expected, largely from prior widespread tOPV use in immunisation 74 
campaigns (approximately 1.5 billion doses in the 12 months before the Switch) [10, 11]. The 75 
response to any outbreaks was to conduct campaigns with mOPV2, from a finite global stockpile of 76 
vaccine [3].While the virus disappeared from most geographies, eradication did not occur  [12]. 77 
More recently, outbreaks of VDPV2 have been increasing in frequency and geographic spread 78 
(Figure 1). At present, WHO classifies circulating VDPV2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks as Public Health 79 
Emergencies of International Concern [13] . Here we investigate the epidemiology and source of 80 
  
VDPV2 outbreaks through a retrospective analysis of poliovirus surveillance and mOPV2 campaign 81 
data between 01 May 2016 and 01 November 2019.   82 
 83 
We obtained data on virus isolates from acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases and environmental 84 
samples through the surveillance network of the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN), on 01 85 
November 2019.  Between 01 May 2016 and 01 November 2019, the GPLN had detected 859 86 
isolates of VDPV2 and 325 cases of AFP across 26 countries (Figure 1). The AFP cases had a 87 
median age of 1.75 years (range 0.2-12 years) and 27.0% of cases reported receiving no previous 88 
polio vaccine doses.   89 
 90 
We estimate the date of seeding interval (i.e. 95% confidence intervals for the date that the infectious 91 
OPV dose was administered) based on the date of detection and the number of nucleotides divergent 92 
from the OPV2 virus in the viral protein 1 (VP1) gene (Supplementary Methods).  We assume that 93 
the first VP1 mutation is instantaneous and each subsequent mutation follows an average rate, 94 
previously estimated at 1.14 x 10-2 nucleotides per site per year, which corresponds to 1 nucleotide 95 
change observed after approximately 35 days [14]. The time to each independent mutation is 96 
modelled using an exponential distribution and the sum of waiting times as an Erlang distribution.  97 
 98 
We calculate that 65.5% (548/837) of sequenced VDPV2 viruses detected since April 2016 have a > 99 
90% probability of being seeded after the Switch (Figure 2a). For isolates with a >90% probability of 100 
being seeded after the Switch, we identified whether a mOPV2 campaign was conducted within the 101 
same geographic region during the estimated seeding interval. We demonstrate that the source of 102 
71.5% (392/548) of these isolates are consistent with mOPV2 outbreak response campaigns 103 
conducted within the country of emergence and 24.6% (135/548) consistent with mOPV2 campaigns 104 
conducted within a neighbouring country (Figure 2b).  105 
 106 
  
VDPV isolates are classified as circulating VDPV2 (cVDPV2), when there is evidence of person-to-107 
person transmission (isolates are genetically linked to a previously detected isolate) or ambiguous 108 
VDPV (aVDPV) events, when there is no evidence of transmission and after ruling out primary 109 
immunodeficiency in infected individuals [15, 16]. 110 
  111 
Since the Switch, we identify 62 aVDPV2 events and 41 independent cVDPV2 outbreaks (Figure 3, 112 
Table S1). A total of 126 post-Switch mOPV2 campaigns have been conducted in response to these 113 
outbreaks, utilising more than 300 million doses of the mOPV2 vaccine (Table S2), primarily in 114 
Nigeria (59%) and DRC (15%). These campaigns are consistent with seeding up to 28 of the 41 115 
cVDPV2 outbreaks (Table S2). 116 
 117 
The 41 cVDPV2 outbreaks emerged in Angola (n = 7), Central African Republic (CAR) (n=6), 118 
China (n=1), DRC (n = 10), Mozambique (n = 1), Nigeria (n = 9), Pakistan (n=3), Philippines (n=1), 119 
Somalia (n = 1), Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) (n = 1) and Zambia (n=1). International spread of 120 
cVDPV2s has led to transmission in Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya 121 
and Togo. The countries where these outbreaks occur are mainly characterized by suboptimal health 122 
systems with low routine immunisation coverage, inaccessible/active conflict affected areas and low 123 
sanitation and hygiene (Table S1).  124 
 125 
In the first year after the Switch (May 2016- April 2017), our analysis shows that there were six 126 
cVDPV2 outbreaks, seeded before (n=5) or close to the time of the Switch (n=1), likely through 127 
immunisation with tOPV (Figure 3, Table S1). This was consistent with the predictions made, 128 
including from mathematical modelling groups [10, 17]. These outbreaks, which occurred in Nigeria 129 
(n=2), DRC (n=2), Pakistan (n=1) and Syria (n=1) were rapidly controlled through mOPV2 use 130 
(Table S1) mention [18].  131 
 132 
  
Interestingly, we observe that no virus was detected later than 6 months following the Switch in the 133 
American, European and South-East Asian Regions of WHO: no cVDPV2 outbreaks occurred and 134 
the rare detection of aVDPV2 in the first 6 months in these regions was limited likely because of 135 
generally high pre-switch intestinal mucosal immunity, good sanitation standards and post-switch 136 
IPV use [12, 19].  137 
 138 
In the second year after the Switch (May 2017 to April 2018), 5 more outbreaks emerged (Table S1). 139 
We calculate that 1/5 were seeded before and 4/5 were seeded after the Switch (Figure 2). In two of 140 
these outbreaks (SOM-BAN-1 and NIE-JIG-1 emergences), failure to control the virus has resulted 141 
in spread across national borders to establish transmission in neighbouring countries: from Somalia 142 
to Kenya and Ethiopia, and from Nigeria to Niger, Cameroon, Ghana, Benin, Chad, Togo and Côte 143 
d'Ivoire (Table S1). These two outbreaks, which have not yet been controlled, are the longest in 144 
duration, with transmission detected for periods of 22 and 21 months, respectively (Table S1). 145 
 146 
In the third and fourth years after the Switch (May 2018 to November 2019), it was expected (and 147 
planned) that there would be a substantial reduction in the number of outbreaks [17]. However, we 148 
demonstrate the highest frequency of outbreaks has been in this period:  10 outbreaks emerged 149 
between May 2018 and April 2019, and 20 in the period from May 2019 to November 2019 alone. 150 
Our analysis shows that all except one of these emergences were seeded after the Switch (Figure 1).  151 
 152 
There has been a shift in epidemiology observed over this period, characterised by the emergence of 153 
several cVDPV2s in 2019 with low nucleotide divergence in geographies without preceding mOPV2 154 
use (Figure 3). There have been six cVDPV outbreaks in the Central African Republic and seven in 155 
Angola (Table S1), which are consistent with seeding from mOPV2 responses in the neighbouring 156 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Additionally, two low divergence cVDPV2s have emerged in 157 
Pakistan, a country where mOPV2 had not been used in outbreak response for more than one year 158 
prior to the estimated seeding date (Table S1). On-going investigations are exploring hypotheses of 159 
  
outbreak source, including multiple international importations from mOPV2-using areas and 160 
inadvertent mOPV2/tOPV use. However, established transmission of cVDPV2 now exists in these 161 
populations and as such, the geographic scope of detections is expanding rapidly (Figure 2).  162 
 163 
The detection of two highly divergent cVDPV2s in China and the Philippines in 2019 confirms 164 
transmission in the Western Pacific Region (Table S1). In the Philippines, a the cVDPV2 was first 165 
detected in a AFP case in June 2019, with 64 nucleotides divergence from OPV2, suggesting the 166 
virus was seeded in 2014 (Figure 3). Subsequently, an individual with primary immunodeficiency 167 
was detected excreting virus genetically linked to the outbreak; however, whether this is the index or 168 
a secondary case, is not clear. It seems unlikely that the virus would circulate undetected for 5 years, 169 
although serotype 2 is thought to have approximately 2000 infections for every paralytic case, yet 170 
these examples emphasise the need for continuing high-quality surveillance and expanding 171 
environmental surveillance [20].  172 
 173 
Using logistic regression, we demonstrate the probability that a new VDPV2 emergence: a) was 174 
seeded after the Switch, is increasing over time (logistic regression coefficient = 1.99, P-Value = 175 
<0.001, intercept = -1.66); and b) establishes person-to-person transmission, is increasing over time 176 
(logistic regression co-efficient estimate = 0.88, P-Value < 0.001, intercept = -2.27). 177 
 178 
At this juncture, we show polio eradication is battling both the new emergences of cVDPV outbreaks 179 
seeded after the Switch, largely through outbreak response mOPV2 use, and outbreaks seeded before 180 
the Switch that had delayed detection. In 2019, we have observed the largest number of outbreaks 181 
and countries experiencing cVDPV2 transmission to date.. We conclude that the GPEI are in a 182 
paradoxical situation: on the one hand, it is not currently possible to control the outbreaks without 183 
inducing intestinal mucosal immunity through mOPV2 use, but on the other hand, the use of mOPV2 184 
is generating VDPV2. This risk of VDPV2 circulation is increasing over time, as the immunity of the 185 
global population rapidly decreases [4].  186 
  
 187 
Policy perspective 188 
 189 
Since the switch over 4 years ago, the epidemiology of type 2 poliovirus has developed in directions 190 
that were neither expected or planned, which has policy implications for polio. Although the Switch 191 
has largely eliminated the incidence of type 2 vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) and 192 
immunodeficiency-related VDPV cases [19], it has not achieved the major objective – that is the 193 
eradication of the last type 2 polioviruses (those originating from the oral poliovirus vaccine) in all 194 
populations. As discussed in the recent Science editorial, the question that remains as to what the 195 
GPEI should do next [20]?  196 
 197 
Almost a decade ago, the GPEI initiated in 2010 the development of two candidates of serotype 2 198 
novel oral poliovirus vaccine (nOPV2), which are currently completing Phase II clinical trials [21]. 199 
The nOPV2 are designed to provide similar intestinal immunity to the current OPV, while being 200 
more genetically stable. Therefore, the major advantage of nOPV2 use in outbreak control would be 201 
a lower risk of seeding new VDPV2 (and circulating VDPV outbreaks). In 2020, there are efforts to 202 
rapidly accelerate the clinical development of one candidate of this vaccine and pursue World Health 203 
Organisation regulatory approval though the Emergency Use Listing procedure [21].  204 
 205 
A strategy for the response to cVDPV2s has been developed for 2020–2021 (unpublished). In the 206 
time before nOPV2 is available, the approach is to conduct enhanced outbreak response campaigns 207 
with the current OPV2 to contain cVDPV2 spread. Capacity to conduct aggressive, rapid and high-208 
quality campaigns is essential, as persistent delays and pockets of low coverage will continually 209 
hinder the impact of outbreak responses with any vaccine, be it the nOPV2 or mOPV2.   210 
 211 
  
Strengthening routine administration of IPV and strategic vaccination with remaining available IPV 212 
doses (to ensure missed children in areas at high risk are reached) will be employed as a paralysis 213 
prevention method.  214 
 215 
When the nOPV2 vaccine becomes available in sufficient quantities, it will be rolled out to 216 
eventually replace mOPV2 in outbreak response. In the situation that nOPV2 does not materialize or 217 
perform as anticipated, or incurs substantial delays, the GPEI would have to implement a 218 
contingency plan (under preparation). The re-introduction of preventative vaccination with mOPV2 219 
or tOPV, either through preventative campaigns or routine immunisation, would have to be 220 
considered. However, this approach would require quantities of mOPV2 or tOPV doses that are 221 
currently not available.  222 
 223 
It is critical that cVDPV outbreaks be managed as national public health emergencies in line with the 224 
declaration of a Public Health Emergencies of International Concern by the WHO [13]. All GPEI 225 
partners, member state governments and agencies must fully operationalize their emergency 226 
frameworks to prevent the re-establishment of endemic transmission of type 2 poliovirus in the form 227 
of cVDPV2. It remains clear that OPV removal is essential to stop all cases of paralytic 228 
poliomyelitis. However, the epidemiology that has evolved since OPV2 removal has implications on 229 
existing strategies outlined for total OPV cessation, which need urgent attention [22]. 230 
 231 
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Fig. 1. Geographic location of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 isolates detected after the removal of 322 
type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), between 01 May 2016 and 01 November 2019. Data as of 01 323 
November 2019. The colour of points illustrates the date of isolate detection. 324 
 
  
 Fig.2. Incidence of detected global vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 isolates between 01 May 2016 and 325 
01 November 2019. In Figure A, the probability that isolate was seeded after the Switch (01 May 2016) 326 
was calculated based on the 95% CI of the estimated seeding date, estimated by the number of 327 
nucleotides divergence from the poliovirus vaccine strain, in the viral protein 1 gene of the position, 328 
assuming a model for the mutation rate (See Supplementary Material for Methods). In Figure B. for all 329 
isolates with >0.9 probability of post-switch seeding, the colour demonstrates whether there was a 330 
corresponding mOPV2 campaign within estimated dates of seeding and the same or adjacent country.  331 
  
  
Fig. 3. Timeline of cVDPV2 outbreaks reported between 01 May 2016 and 01 November 2019, ordered 332 
by the date of first isolate detection. The estimated seeding date (i.e. the date that infectious OPV dose 333 
was administered) and 95% confidence intervals are given by horizontal bars, coloured by the 334 
probability that date of seeding was after the removal of tOPV on the 01 May 2016 (date of switch 335 
illustrated by a dashed black line). Detected virus isolates shown by coloured circles, with the colour 336 
indicating whether the outbreak is assumed active (detection within previous 12 months) or closed (no 337 
detection in previous 12 months). All as of 01 November 2019.  338 
NIE-BOS-16: This outbreak was genetically linked to a cVDPV2 emergence originating in Chad in 339 
2012.  340 
 341 
 342 
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Materials and Methods  368 
 369 
Materials 370 
The primary surveillance sources of the GPEI are cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) among 371 
children aged <15 years. As part of the case investigation detailed case histories and stool samples are 372 
collected to determine poliovirus infection. Environmental surveillance has been established within 373 
more than 30 countries where wastewater samples are collected and tested for polioviruses. Additional 374 
surveillance includes outbreak response contact sampling and community sampling [3, 16]. All collected 375 
samples are tested in Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) laboratories per WHO protocols with 376 
virus isolation, intratypic differentiation (ITD) and genomic sequencing, to identify WPV, Sabin-like 377 
(derived from oral poliovirus vaccine) poliovirus, and vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPV) [23, 24]. 378 
Poliovirus isolates are classified by comparing the nucleotide sequence of the coding region of the viral 379 
capsid protein 1 (VP1) with the corresponding vaccine strain: for serotype 2, Sabin-like virus are > 0 and 380 
< 6 nucleotides divergent and VDPV2s are > 6 nucleotides divergent from the 903 nucleotide VP1 381 
[23].[23]. VDPVs are further classified as 1) cVDPV, when evidence of person-to-person transmission 382 
in the community exists; 2) immunodeficiency-related VDPV (iVDPV), when they are isolated from 383 
persons with primary immunodeficiencies; and 3) ambiguous VDPV (aVDPV), when they are clinical 384 
isolates from persons with no known immunodeficiency and no evidence of transmission, or they are 385 
sewage isolates that are unrelated to other known VDPVs and whose source is unknown [6, 15]. 386 
cVDPV2 outbreaks are coded and tracked by a designation of the country, the state or province, and a 387 
sequential count of the emergence from that geography (e.g. the third cVDPV2 outbreak occurring in 388 
Sokoto State of Nigeria is coded NIE-SOS-3). The iVDPV cases are excluded from this analysis. 389 
All mOPV2 supplemental immunisation activities conducted between 01 May 2016 and 01 390 
August 2019 were exported from Polio Information System (polIS) database. The exported data 391 
included the start and end date of campaign activity, administrative area (Admin 0, Admin 1 and Admin 392 
  
2 levels) and the number of doses distributed. Geographical information system data for boundaries of 393 
administrative areas (Admin levels 0, 1 and 2) were obtained from the World Health Organization. The 394 
Admin 0 level is referred to as country. All Sabin-like and VDPV2 poliovirus isolates with date of 395 
sample collection between 01 May 2016 and 01 November 2019 were exported from the polIS line list. 396 
Extracted data for each isolate included the date of detection (or sample collection), virus classification, 397 
surveillance method, and VP1 nucleotide divergence from the Sabin 2 vaccine. The Admin 1 level 398 
routine immunisation coverage estimates for all African countries were taken as the estimated coverage 399 
of three doses of Diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP3) in 2016, from Mosser et al  [25]. For countries 400 
outside the African continent, routine immunisation coverage was defined as the proportion of non-polio 401 
AFP cases in the given Admin 1 region who reported receiving 3 OPV doses through routine 402 
immunisation aged between 12-24 months from 2016 to 2019, as used previously [12].  403 
All data was exported as of 01 November 2019. 404 
 405 
Methods 406 
For all VDPV2 isolates and outbreaks we estimate the seeding date and likely source from which 407 
the virus was seeded after the withdrawal of OPV2 using the following methods. We define the date of 408 
seeding of VDPV2 as the date that the infectious OPV2 dose was administered which subsequently 409 
evolved into VDPV2. First, the date of seeding for each isolate was estimated with 95% confidence 410 
intervals (CI) by back-calculating from the date of detection (either AFP case or ENV sample) based on 411 
the number of nucleotide differences in the VP1 sequence from the Sabin 2 strain. We assumed that the 412 
first VP1 mutation is instantaneous and each subsequent mutation follows an average rate, previously 413 
estimated at 1.14 x 10-2 nucleotides per site per year, which corresponds to 1 nucleotide change observed 414 
after approximately 35 days [14]. The waiting time to each independent mutation is modelled using an 415 
exponential distribution that assumes a constant evolution rate, and the Erlang distribution is the sum of 416 
the waiting times. The Erlang distribution had a shape parameter equal to n-1, where n is the number of 417 
  
VP1 nucleotide changes of the isolate, and a scale parameter equal to the product of the number of VP1 418 
nucleotides (901) and the average mutation rate (1.14 x 10-2 nucleotides per site per year). For isolates 419 
that were part of an emergence group that had > 1 isolate, we estimate the date of seeding for that 420 
emergence group by combining data from multiple isolates and then assigning this date of seeding to all 421 
isolates in the group. We selected the earliest three detected isolates of an outbreak and resampled each 422 
of their estimated dates of seeding 1000 times to produce a combined distribution with a median date 423 
and 95% CI. The analysis was restricted to the nucleotide differences of the first three isolates as using 424 
all isolates would have to account for the specific location of nucleotide mutations between isolates, 425 
which were not available for analysis. For sensitivity analysis, we repeated the procedure by selecting 426 
between one and up to ten of the earliest detected isolates, which did not result in any significant 427 
changes (Supplementary Figure 2). The limitations of this analysis are discussed below. 428 
The probability that VDPV isolates were seeded after the switch (taken as 01 May 2016) was 429 
calculated using the cumulative probability of the empirical distribution of the estimated seeding date 430 
and determining what proportion of this distribution is greater than 01 May 2016. For VDPV isolates 431 
with a probability of seeding after the switch above 0.9, the database of mOPV2 campaigns was 432 
searched to identify mOPV2 campaigns occurring within the time-frame of the estimated date of seeding 433 
(95% CI), within the same state/province (Admin 1 level), country (Admin 0 level) or a neighbouring 434 
country. If more than one mOPV2 campaign was within the estimated date of seeding interval, the 435 
campaign closest in time (to the median estimated seeding date) was chosen in the nearest geographic 436 
area (i.e. 1st - Campaigns in the same Admin 1 level, 2nd - Campaigns from the same Admin 0 level, and 437 
3rd - Campaigns from neighbouring countries).  438 
Generalized linear models (GLMs) were used to quantify the patterns of VDPV emergences over 439 
time. For the GLMs, we computed univariate logistic regression (family = binomial, link = logit) on the 440 
index isolate of each genetic VDPV emergence. The predictor variable was the time in years between 441 
the Switch (taken as 01 May 2016) and date of detection. The binary response variables were:  estimated 442 
  
seeding date is post-switch (yes or no); and emergence evolved into a cVDPV2 outbreak (yes or no). For 443 
all GLMs we report co-efficient estimates and accompanying P-value.    444 
The limitations of our analysis include the absence of genetic sequencing data from VDPV 445 
isolates to inform the estimated date of sequencing. The genetic information available for each isolate 446 
was the genetic cluster (emergence group) the virus was associated with and the number of nucleotides 447 
divergent from Sabin 2 in the VP1 gene. The ability to construct a phylogenetic tree using genetic 448 
sequences would provide more accurate inference. In this analysis, we have not considered the time 449 
between the most recent mutation and time of detection, as this short time is not programmatically 450 
significant compared to the uncertainty in the time of seeding (range of 304-1100 days) captured by the 451 
95% confidence intervals.   452 
  
Table S1. 
  
Outbreak 
Code 
Country Date 
detected 
Date of most 
recent isolate 
Number of impacted 
states (country: 
states) 
Assumed 
status1 
Observed 
duration, 
months 
RI coverage2, 
mean estimate 
(95% CI) 
Isolates 
(n) 
AFP 
cases 
(n) 
Mean case 
age, 
months (n) 
VP1 
nucleotide 
divergence 
(range)3 
NIE-BOS-
16 
 
Nigeria 26-Mar-16 26-Aug-16 1 (Nigeria: Borno) Closed 5 0.29 (0.1, 0.47) 2 0 NaN (0) 37,37 
SYR-1 Syrian Arab 
Republic 
27-Aug-16 21-Sep-17 3 (Syrian Arab 
Republic: Deir Al 
Zour, Raqua, Homs) 
Closed 13 (0.14, 0.5) 117 74 18.6 (74) 22,34 
PAK-QTA-
1 
Pakistan 20-Oct-16 28-Dec-16 1 (Pakistan: 
Balochistan) 
Closed 2 (0.19, 0.39) 5 1 16 (1) 10,18 
NIE-SOS-2 Nigeria 28-Oct-16 02-Mar-17 1 (Nigeria: Sokoto) Closed 4 0.04 (0, 0.08) 3 1 30 (1) 7,17 
RDC-HLO-
1 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
20-Feb-17 27-May-18 4 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Haut 
Lomami, 
Tanganika, Haut 
Katanga, Ituri) 
Closed 15 0.62 (0.5, 0.74) 50 27 25.5 (27) 14,29 
  
RDC-MAN-
1 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
26-Mar-17 02-May-17 1 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Maniema) 
Closed 1 0.51 (0.3, 0.7) 3 2 30 (2) 7,9 
SOM-BAN-
1 
Somalia 22-Oct-17 13-Aug-19 9 (Somalia: Banadir 
Irobi, Hiran, Gedo, 
Lower Juba, Sool) 
Ongoing 22 0.58 (0.2, 0.88) 44 12 40.6 (10) 37,55 
NIE-JIS-1 Nigeria 10-Jan-18 10-Oct-19 24 (Nigeria: Jigawa, 
Gombe, Yobe, 
Borno, Katsina, 
Zinder) 
Ongoing 21 0.09 (0, 0.17) 239 65 30.5 (62) 13,35 
NIE-SOS-3 Nigeria 30-Jan-18 18-Mar-19 2 (Nigeria: Sokoto, 
Niger) 
Ongoing 14 0.04 (0, 0.08) 15 1 19 (1) 6,14 
CHN-XIN-1 China 18-Apr-18 18-Aug-19 2 (China: Xinjiang, 
Sichuan) 
Ongoing 16 1 (0.15, 1.0)5 5 1 53 (1) 13,33 
RDC-MON-
1 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
26-Apr-18 08-Nov-18 1 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Mongala) 
Ongoing 6 0.45 (0.3, 0.59) 21 11 14.1 (11) 18,26 
RDC-HKA-
1 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
06-Oct-18 07-Oct-18 1 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Closed 0 0.73 (0.6, 0.82) 2 2 80.5 (2) 7,8 
  
Congo: Haut 
Katanga) 
MOZ-ZAM-
2 
Mozambique 21-Oct-18 17-Dec-18 1 (Mozambique: 
Zambezia) 
Ongoing 2 0.91 (0.8, 0.97) 3 1 75 (1) 6,10 
RDC-KAS-
1 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
08-Feb-19 17-Mar-19 1 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Kasai) 
Ongoing 1 0.68 (0.5, 0.81) 3 1 24 (1) 6,7 
RDC-HLO-
2 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
10-Feb-19 02-Sep-19 2 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Haut 
Lomami, Haut 
Katanga) 
Ongoing 7 0.62 (0.5, 0.74) 16 11 16.5 (11) 8,12 
NIE-SOS-4 Nigeria 18-Mar-19 10-Jun-19 1 (Nigeria: Sokoto) Ongoing 3 0.04 (0, 0.08) 3 0 NaN (0) 16,20 
RDC-KAS-
2 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
03-Apr-19 07-Jun-19 1 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Kasai) 
Ongoing 2 0.68 (0.5, 0.81) 4 4 35 (4) 6,11 
ANG-LNO-
1 
Angola 05-Apr-19 14-May-19 1 (Angola: Lunda 
Norte) 
Ongoing 1 0.22 (0.1, 0.35) 2 1 16 (1) 8,10 
PAK-RWP-
1 
Pakistan 11-Apr-19 11-Apr-19 1 (Pakistan: Punjab) Ongoing 0 0.85 (0.82, 0.88) 1 0 NaN (0) 7,7 
  
RDC-SAN-
1 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
21-Apr-19 20-Sep-19 2 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Sankuru, 
Kasai Oriental) 
Ongoing 5 0.46 (0.3, 0.61) 23 19 21.5 (15) 6,16 
ANG-HUI-1 Angola 27-Apr-19 25-Sep-19 5 (Angola: Huila, 
Cuanza Sul, 
Kwanza Sul, 
Huambo) 
Ongoing 5 0.33 (0.21, 0.48) 29 15 35 (1) 6,13 
CAF-BAM-
1 
Central 
African 
Republic 
01-May-
19 
07-Sep-19 3 (Central African 
Republic: RS1, 
RS4, RS7) 
Ongoing 4 0.36 (0.1, 0.63) 17 4 33.7 (3) 10,17 
NIE-SOS-5 Nigeria 20-May-
19 
13-Jun-19 1 (Nigeria: Sokoto) Ongoing 1 0.04 (0, 0.08) 2 1 48 (1) 14,15 
CAF-BAM-
2 
Central 
African 
Republic 
27-May-
19 
29-Aug-19 2 (Central African 
Republic: RS4, 
RS5) 
Ongoing 3 0.44 (0.2, 0.73) 6 1 30 (1) 7,12 
CAF-BIM-1 Central 
African 
Republic 
28-May-
19 
30-Sep-19 3 (Central African 
Republic: RS1, 
RS4, RS7) 
Ongoing 4 0.36 (0.1, 0.63) 7 4 33 (1) 6,16 
  
CAF-BIM-2 
Central 
African 
Republic 
28-May-
19 05-Oct-19 
3 (Central African 
Republic: RS1, 
RS7, RS6) Ongoing 4 0.36 (0.1, 0.63) 21 2 NaN (0) 7,18 
ANG-LNO-
2 Angola 01-Jun-19 15-Sep-19 
5 (Angola: Lunda 
Norte, Lunda Sul, 
Malanje, Kwanza 
Sul, Moxico) Ongoing 3 0.22 (0.1, 0.35) 7 6 15 (2) 9,15 
RDC-KAS-
3 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 03-Jun-19 18-Sep-19 
2 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Kasai, 
Kwilu) Ongoing 4 0.68 (0.5, 0.81) 4 4 22.7 (3) 8,16 
ANG-LNO-
3 Angola 07-Jun-19 23-Sep-19 
3 (Angola: Lunda 
Norte, Uíge, 
Luanda) Ongoing 4 0.22 (0.1, 0.35) 11 8 NaN (0) 6,11 
PAK-GB-1 Pakistan 10-Jun-19 11-Sep-19 
3 (Pakistan: Punjab, 
Gilgit Baltistan, 
Islamabad) Ongoing 3 0.85 (0.82, 0.88) 6 3 NaN (0) 7,11 
NIE-KGS-1 Nigeria 13-Jun-19 02-Oct-19 1 (Nigeria: Kogi) Ongoing 4 0.46 (0.3, 0.62) 3 2 29 (1) 8,9 
NIE-KGS-2 Nigeria 20-Jun-19 08-Aug-19 1 (Nigeria: Kogi) Ongoing 2 0.46 (0.3, 0.62) 6 2 34.5 (2) 7,10 
NIE-SOS-6 Nigeria 24-Jun-19 11-Sep-19 1 (Nigeria: Sokoto) Ongoing 3 0.04 (0, 0.08) 3 0 NaN (0) 6,10 
  
PHL-NCR-1 Philippines 26-Jun-19 15-Oct-19 
3 (Philippines: 
Armm, Ncr, 
Southern Mindanao) Ongoing 4 0.32 (0.16, 0.52) 12 3 NaN (0) 63,71 
RDC-TPA-1 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 27-Jun-19 14-Aug-19 
1 (Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo: Tshuapa) Ongoing 2 0.41 (0.3, 0.55) 6 0 NaN (0) 7,11 
ANG-HUA-
1 Angola 02-Jul-19 16-Jul-19 
1 (Angola: 
Huambo) Ongoing 0 0.45 (0.3, 0.58) 2 2 NaN (0) 6,6 
ZAM-LUA-
1 Zambia 16-Jul-19 25-Sep-19 1 (Zambia: Luapula) Ongoing 2 0.84 (0.7, 0.93) 3 1 NaN (0) 9,10 
ANG-HUA-
2 Angola 30-Jul-19 21-Aug-19 
1 (Angola: 
Huambo) Ongoing 1 0.45 (0.3, 0.58) 3 2 NaN (0) 6,6 
CAF-BIM-3 
Central 
African 
Republic 30-Jul-19 22-Aug-19 
1 (Central African 
Republic: RS1) Ongoing 1 0.36 (0.1, 0.63) 4 2 30 (2) 9,15 
CAF-BAN-
1 
Central 
African 
Republic 16-Aug-19 03-Sep-19 
2 (Central African 
Republic: RS7, 
RS2) Ongoing 1 0.45 (0.2, 0.73) 4 1 NaN (0) 7,9 
ANG-HUA-
3 Angola 19-Aug-19 19-Aug-19 
2 (Angola: 
Benguela, Huambo) Ongoing 0 0.31 (0.2, 0.45) 2 2 NaN (0) 7,8 
  
 
Summary and demography of classified circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks detected between May 2016 
and 01 November 2019, data as of 01 November 2019.  
1Status is dependent on whether there has been detection of the cVDPV virus in the past 12 months, as of 01 November 2019. 
2Routine immunisation coverage estimate from the Admin 1 area in which emergence was first detected; see supplementary methods. 
3Number of nucleotides differences in the viral protein 1 gene (VP1) of the detected poliovirus compared to the Sabin 2 virus in oral 
poliovirus vaccine. 
4This outbreak was identified to be genetically linked to a cVDPV2 emergence originating in Chad in 2012. 
5Routine immunisation coverage estimate provided as a country estimate for China. 
Abbreviation: AFP, Acute Flaccid Paralysis; RI, Routine Immunisation; VP1, Viral Protein 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table S2. 
Country Number of 
outbreaks 
detected 
since 01 
May 2016 
Number of 
rounds 
Total 
mOPV 
doses 
(million) 
Doses per round 
(million),  
median (range)  
Number aVDPV events consistent 
with time of mOPV2 campaign1 
Number cVDPV outbreaks 
consistent with time of mOPV2 
campaign1 
In the 
OBRA 
In the  
country 
Neighbourin
g country 
In the 
OBRA 
In the  
country 
Outside 
country 
Angola 7 8 4.1 0.35 (0.1-1.18) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Benin 1 1 0.3 0.3 (0.3-0.3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cameroon 1 5 4.3 0.24 (0.02-3.68) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central African 
Republic 
6 2 0.9 0.45 (0.07-0.83) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chad 1 4 2.3 0.2 (0.19-1.75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
10 25 35.3 0.72 (0-7.92) 0 1 0 2 5 132 
Ethiopia 1 5 2.4 0.52 (0.19-0.59) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 1 2 2.1 1.05 (0.18-1.92) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 1 3 6.1 2.42 (0.82-2.88) 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Mozambique 1 6 5.3 0.65 (0.5-1.48) 0 0 0 03 0 0 
  
Niger 1 9 17.2 2.52 (0.15-4.63) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria 9 37 170.6 1.96 (0-38.3) 26 6 0 5 2 0 
Pakistan 3 3 3 0.79 (0.51-1.66) 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Somalia 1 11 7.6 0.73 (0.05-1.6) 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
1 4 1.6 0.45 (0.15-0.59) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Togo 1 1 0.1 0.14 (0.14-0.14) 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Outbreak response to circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus serotype 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks and subsequent isolation of type 
2 poliovirus by country, between 01 May 2016 and 01 November 2019.  
1We define a VDPV consistent with time of mOPV2 campaigns as a VDPV where the estimated date of seeding 95% confidence 
interval spans an mOPV2 campaign in a similar geographic region. The geographic region is classified as within outbreak response 
area (OBRA), within the country (but outside OBRA) or within a neighbouring country to the mOPV2 campaign.  
2There are 7 cVDPV2 in Angola and 6 in Central African Republic with estimated dates of seeding spanning mOPV2 campaigns 
conducted in the neighbouring country of Democratic Republic of Congo. 
3The cVDPV outbreak in Mozambique, Zambezia (MOZ-ZAM-2) is estimated to have been seeded at least 4 months after the mOPV2 
campaign in Zambezia. 
  
 
Fig. S1. Roadmap of the key timepoints in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative Endgame Strategic Plan. 
 
 
 
Fig. S2: Sensitivity analysis on the number of isolates selected into generating the estimated date of seeding for a VDPV emergence 
group. Black circles and horizontal lines indicate the median date of seeding with 95% CI that were used in this manuscript, calculated 
  
using from the nucleotide divergence of the first three isolates detected of an emergence group. Coloured circles show the median date 
of seeding calculated when one (red) or up to ten (blue) of the first detected isolates of an emergence group were used. 
 
  
 
